Roadmap
What is built, what is being built now, and what is planned next.
Shipped
Released and running, built between July and August 2026.
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Encrypted storage and key management
Every secret is sealed in its own AES-256-GCM envelope, under a key hierarchy rooted in a key that lives outside the database and outside the container image.
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Accounts and sign-in
Registration with mandatory two-step verification, an independent Google sign-in path, session lifecycle, re-verification before sensitive actions, email recovery, and account deletion that waits before it takes effect.
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Vaults, entries and search
Vaults, collections and four entry templates. Search that never bulk-decrypts, reveal and copy with a clipboard timer, revision history, and a trash only a person empties.
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Agent access over REST and MCP
Scoped, permissioned keys for agents and integrations, a REST API and a remote MCP server behind one authorization service, and an audit trail of every disclosure an agent caused.
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Import, backup and export
KeePass import, a portable encrypted backup that restores onto a clean host, and a plaintext CSV export that warns you before it writes one.
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Quotas and restricted administration
Limits on what one account can hold, and an administrator who can suspend an account or lift a quota but can never read a vault.
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Deployment and operations
A hardened container, least-privileged database logins, immutable published images, deploys that are deliberate rather than automatic, and a rehearsed restore drill.
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Security hardening and adversarial testing
Platform hardening, then dedicated test suites attacking every trust boundary in the design, closed by a review against the OWASP application security standard.
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Edge browser extension
Autofill that matches a page's exact origin and nothing looser, from an enrollment you approve and can revoke at any time.
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Fixes to shipped behaviour
Corrections to code already in production: client metadata that was not being coarsened, a hostname check that failed instead of refusing, and a backup step no database login could run.
In progress
Being built now. The activity log is partly usable; the other two are still groundwork you cannot see yet.
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Security activity log
Vault records more than seventy kinds of security event and keeps them for a year. This is where the account owner reads their own: sign-ins, failed second factors, reveals, exports, and changes to agent keys.
6 of 12 steps complete
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Password health report
Which stored passwords are weak, reused, unchanged for years, or already in a public breach corpus. Computed on demand behind re-verification, and never kept as a digest of your real secrets.
1 of 5 steps complete
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Rotation reminders
Record when a credential is due to be rotated, see what is due or overdue while browsing, and be reminded before it matters. An overdue entry keeps working exactly as it did.
1 of 6 steps complete
Next up
Started once the three above are finished, in this order. Ordered rather than scheduled: none of it carries a date.
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Security notifications
Email for the events that matter: a sign-in from an unfamiliar device, a new agent key, an export taken. Delivered reliably rather than best effort. Today only one kind of event sends mail at all.
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Import from CSV, 1Password and Bitwarden
More ways in than KeePass, including Vault's own CSV export, which it cannot read back today.
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Agent recovery and containers
Let an agent create the vault it needs and undo what its own key set aside. Destroying anything stays a decision only a person makes.
Later
Planned in roughly this order, with nothing committed.
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Command-line client
Read one secret in a shell script, or run a command with secrets in its environment, without writing an HTTP client first.
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Tags, favourites and saved views
Organise entries across vaults and collections instead of only inside one.
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Chrome and Firefox autofill
The same extension, built from the same reviewed source, in two more browsers.
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Passkey sign-in
A third way to prove an account at sign-in and before sensitive actions, alongside the password and second factor.
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File attachments
Keep the recovery kit, the certificate or the key file beside the credential it belongs to, encrypted the same way the entry is.
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Emergency access
Name a contact who can request access to your vault, with a waiting period you can refuse inside and a grant you can revoke at any time.
Known issues
Open against the current release.
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Primary buttons fail contrast in the dark theme
An accessibility requirement the rest of the interface is held to, missed on the most-used control.
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The one security alert is best effort
It is sent during the request and dropped if the mail server is unreachable. Security notifications, above, replace that path rather than patching it.
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KeePass import discards folders and tags
Structure in the source file is dropped without saying so. The import work above is where folders become collections.
Not planned
Decisions rather than a backlog. These are not coming later.
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End-to-end encryption
The server is trusted to decrypt what it is authorized to return. Vault is not zero-knowledge and does not claim to be.
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Agents that delete permanently
An agent can set an entry aside for review. Confirming a deletion stays with a person.
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Bulk secret reads
No endpoint or tool returns more than one entry's secrets, and none ever will.
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Stored password digests
The health report keeps a verdict, never a hash of your real passwords. That table would be exactly the thing the feature exists to warn you about.
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Hardware key custody
The root key is a file on the host, mounted read-only. No hardware module and no cloud key service.
Last updated 7 September 2026 from the project's issue tracker. What Vault does